Privacy in the Information Age by Reedy, Stephanie
Denver Law Review 
Volume 77 
Issue 3 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 8 
January 2021 
Privacy in the Information Age 
Stephanie Reedy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Stephanie Reedy, Privacy in the Information Age, 77 Denv. U. L. Rev. 569 (2000). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital 
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE
INTRODUCTION
Developing technology and increased access to information have
had a tremendous impact on daily life, making transactions and activities
quicker, cheaper, and less complicated than before. Instead of going to a
bank and getting cash to make purchases, a simple swipe of a card auto-
matically deducts the amount from your account. Cashiers scan bar codes
into computers that automatically tally the price of an order, and con-
sumers using grocery store "savings cards" automatically receive dis-
counts on specially advertised items.
However, these conveniences and savings come with a hidden price
tag. Computers that make debit and savings cards possible also collect
personal information and provide that information to others.' Opening a
checking account, buying groceries, getting a license, paying taxes, and
using the telephone results in the collection and possible dissemination of
personal information. The sale of this information, ranging from socio-
economic and cultural background to personal preferences and biases,
2has become a major industry in the United States. These bits of infor-
mation are "key marketing tools that permit sellers to direct their adver-
tising and sales efforts toward the proper population segments and to
design future products in conformity with projected buying behaviors."3
In the midst of this highly profitable trade in personal information,
privacy issues have taken on greater significance.4 Technological devel-
opments "have led to the emergence of an 'information society' capable
of gathering, storing, and disseminating increasing amounts of data about
individual citizens."5 Determining whether to restrict access to such in-
formation and how to regulate those restrictions is a "hotly contested"
issue among both legal scholars and the public.6 Although there have
been some efforts at protecting the individual's right to informational
privacy through legislation, those efforts have been isolated and lack
uniformity.7 "Statutory and decisional privacy law alike have developed
1. See generally Katrin Schatz Byford, Privacy in Cyberspace: Constructing a Model of
Privacy for the Electronic Communications Environment, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1,
43, 48, 49 (1998) (discussing how electronic networks will serve as the primary vehicle for the
collection and sale of personal information).





7. See id. at 2.
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in an erratic and haphazard fashion; no single theory of privacy, nor even
a consistent set of theories, has informed this process."8
A major obstacle to creating a uniform policy or rationale for pri-
vacy of personal information is the conflict that arises when an individ-
ual attempts to prevent the release of this information. Privacy is not a
clear-cut, black-and-white issue. Protecting individual privacy threatens
the democratic principles of an open, accessible government and nega-
tively influences the profit margins of powerful commercial interests.
These protections-which often take the form of legislation enacted by
Congress-also raise important constitutional concerns and problems of
inconsistent statutory interpretation.
This paper considers two of the Tenth Circuit's decisions regarding
the interpretation of informational privacy protection over the last year,9
and discusses various social and legal conflicts at the heart of the infor-
mational privacy debate.' ° Part One discusses the constitutional battles
that occur, both when the federal government attempts to regulate pri-
vacy in the states, and when conflict arises between maintaining public
government records and protecting personal privacy. In Reno v.
Condon," the United States Supreme Court affirmed the principles set
forth by the Tenth Circuit in Oklahoma v. United States.12 Reno dealt
with privacy matters that implicate the United States Constitution, and
specifically, the Tenth Amendment.
3
Part Two discusses the problems courts face when interpreting pri-
vacy-protection statutes enacted by Congress, and focuses on a federal
statute enacted to protect the privacy of income-tax filings. In Rice v.
United States,'4 the Tenth Circuit joined at least one other circuit that
expanded the plain meaning of a provision of the Internal Revenue Code,
8. Id.
9. The survey period extends from September 1, 1998 through August 31, 1999.
10. The Tenth Circuit also considered informational privacy issues in U.S. West v. FCC. U.S.
West v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999). In that case, the court considered provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 that prevent telecommunications carriers from using proprietary
customer information for marketing purposes without prior customer approval. U.S. West, 182 F.2d
at 1228. U.S. West claimed that the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") rules created to
implement the 1996 Act violated the First Amendment because they restricted U.S. West from
engaging in commercial speech with customers. Id. at 1230. The court conducted a four-part First
Amendment analysis and determined that the FCC "failed to satisfy its burden of showing that the
customer approval regulations restrict no more speech than necessary to serve the asserted state
interests." Id. at 1239. The court, after finding that the rules violated the First Amendment, vacated
the FCC's Order and the regulations it had adopted. Id. at 1239-40.
11. 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000). The court's decision was January 12, 2000. See Reno, 120 S.Ct. at
666.
12. 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998).
13. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 670-71. The Tenth Amendment reserves to states all powers not
expressly given to the federal government. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. X.
14. 166 F.3d 1088 (10th Cir. 1999).
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enacted to protect the confidentiality of tax-return information.' 5 Because
of this judicially created exception to the statute, the Internal Revenue
Service may release confidential tax information from tax-evasion con-
victions to the press.
16
I. PUBLIC RECORDS OR INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPLICATIONS OF FEDERAL PRIVACY LEGISLATION IN THE DRIVER'S
PRIVACY-PROTECTION ACT 7
A. Background
"There is a long and well recognized public interest in open govern-
ment" and in maintaining public access to government records so that
citizens may directly monitor the functions of government agencies.'8
Yet, in the field of motor vehicles records information, where states his-
torically maintained public records," the interest in open government
directly conflicts with an individual's desire to keep personal information
from the public. 20
This conflict came into the national spotlight in 1989, when an ob-
sessed fan stalked and killed actress Rebecca Schaeffer in the actress's
home.2' The fan obtained Schaeffer's address and other personal infor-
mation from a private detective, who obtained the information from
Schaeffer's motor vehicle record.22 Schaeffer's death sparked a flurry of
anti-stalking legislation at the state level.2" By 1993, all 50 states had
enacted some sort of anti-stalking measure. In 1994, Congress enacted
the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA")," compelling states to
regulate motor vehicle record disclosures according to a uniform national
policy 6
The DPPA prohibits any State Department of Motor Vehicles from
knowingly disclosing personal information obtained from a motor vehi-
cle record.27 The State may disclose personal information only in matters
15. See Rice, 166 F.3d at 1091 (citing Thomas v. United States, 890 F.2d 18, 21 (7th Cir.
1989)).
16. See id. at 1092.
17. Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998).
18. Thomas H. Odom & Gregory S. Feder, Challenging the Federal Driver's Privacy
Protection Act: The Next Step in Developing a Jurisprudence of Process-Oriented Federalism under
the Tenth Amendment, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 71, 108-09 (1998).
19. See id. at 109.
20. See id. at 76.
21. See id. at 88.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 88-89.
24. See id.
25. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-25 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
26. See id.; see Odom & Feder, supra note 18, at 77.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a) (1994).
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of motor vehicle safety, theft, emissions, recalls and advisories, court
proceedings, research activities, or if the individual gave express
consent." The State may also release motor vehicle record information to
government agencies, to businesses that want to verify the accuracy of
information provided by a consumer, to insurers, licensed private inves-
tigation agencies, employers seeking information about commercial
driving licenses, and with written consent from the individual. 9 The
DPPA provides a criminal fine of $5,000 for each day a motor vehicle
department refuses to comply with DPPA provisions, and provides civil
remedies against anyone who knowingly violates the statute. °
By enacting the DPPA, Congress asserted authority over an area of
regulation that had traditionally been the domain of state government,
causing conflict between the states and federal government regarding the
Tenth Amendment's reservation of power to the states:" Since the early
1900's, state governments "have licensed drivers and registered motor
vehicles," determining the conditions for releasing motor vehicles record
information." Congress, in enacting the DPPA, compelled "States to
regulate disclosure of information from their motor vehicle records in
accordance with a declared uniform national policy."33 A previous at-
tempt to assert federal control over licensing activities failed in 1986,
when Congress sought to enact legislation to create a national licensing
system for commercial drivers.34 Hearings on the bill recognized that
"the licensing of drivers was classified as a traditional State governmen-
tal function," and the legislature aborted the plan.35
The enactment of the DPPA resulted in nationwide litigation and a
split in the circuits over the constitutionality of the statute.36 The United
States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the DPPA,37 thereby
affirming the Tenth Circuit's holding that the DPPA properly regulates
the States' release of an individual's personal information. 3' The Court's
decision further refined the concept of what action results in a Tenth
28. See id. § 2721(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
29. See id.
30. See id. § 2723-24 (1994).
31. See Odom & Feder, supra note 18, at 99.
32. Id. at 99- 100.
33. See id. at 77.
34. See S. REP. NO. 99-411, at 12 (1986).
35. Odom & Feder, supra note 18, at 167.
36. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000); Travis v.
Reno, 163. F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998); Oklahoma v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998);
Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317 (M.D. Ala. 1998), rev'd, 171 F.3d 1281 (1 1th Cir. 1999), vacated,
120 S. Ct. 929 (2000).
37. See Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 672 (2000).
38. See Oklahoma, 161 F.3d at 1272-73.
[Vol. 77:3
PRIVACY
Amendment violation and reinforced the federal government's right to
directly regulate State activities.39
B. Tenth Circuit Case: Oklahoma v. United States'
1. Facts
The Tenth Circuit was one of two Circuits to correctly decide a
DPPA challenge before the Supreme Court announced its January 2000
decision in Reno.4' The Oklahoma case began on September 13, 1997,
when the State of Oklahoma challenged the DPPA in District Court, ar-
guing that the statute directly conflicted with State law and, therefore,
42
was an unconstitutional attempt to regulate state activity.
"Oklahoma law currently provides that motor vehicle records are
public record., 43 The Department of Public Safety must "retain and file
every application for a license it receives ... [and] note whether the ap-
plication is granted or denied; and if denied, the basis thereof."" Further,
Title 47 provides:
The Department of Public Safety or any motor license agent upon
request shall prepare and furnish a summary to any person of the traffic
record of any person subject to the provisions of the motor vehicle laws
of this state. Said summary shall include the enumeration of any motor
vehicle collisions, reference to convictions for violations of motor vehi-
cle laws, and any action taken against the person's privilege to operate a
motor vehicle, as shown by the files of the Department for the three (3)
years preceding the date of the request.45
Oklahoma provides a misdemeanor offense for any public official
who willfully violates the Oklahoma Open Records Act. The state legis-
lature created the act with the express purpose of ensuring "the public's
right of access to and review of government records so they may effi-
ciently and intelligently exercise their inherent political power. 46
While Colorado changed its law to reflect the DPPA's mandate,47
Oklahoma refused, even though Oklahoma's statutes directly conflicted
48with the DPPA. Instead, Oklahoma filed an Application for Preliminary
39. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 671-72.
40. 161 F.3dat 1266.
41. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 666.
42. See Oklahoma v. United States, 994 F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (W.D. Okla. 1997).
43. Oklahoma, 994 F.Supp. at 1360.
44. Id.
45. OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 6-117(H) (1988 & Supp. 2000).
46. OKLA STAT. tit. 51, § 24A.2 (1998 & Supp. 2000).
47. The Colorado Legislature declared that its law was "mandated by the provisions of the
[DPPA] and that the state may be subject to penalties if legislation to comply with the federal act is
not enacted .... " H.B. 97-1348 § I (Colo. 1997).
48. See Odom & Feder, supra note 18, at 116.
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Injunction in federal district court in September 1997, the same month
the DPPA took effect.49 Oklahoma asked the court to enjoin the United
States government from enforcing the DPPA, and challenged the consti-
tutionality of the statute as violating the Tenth and Eleventh Amend-
ments.' ° Oklahoma also argued that Congress exceeded its authority un-
der the Commerce Clause by enacting the statute.
The District Court granted Oklahoma's request and permanently
enjoined the United States from enforcing the DPPA in Oklahoma.52 The
court held that "[t]he power that Congress sought to exercise by dictating
when and how States may disclose personal information from driver's
license records is a power 'not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States . . . .,,,5' According to the
court, the DPPA, "would require Oklahoma to train DPS employees and
the employees in approximately 270 tag agencies across the State on
when and how records may be released. Additionally, the State would be
required to monitor the tag agents to ensure their compliance with the
federal standards. 54
2. Decision
In reversing the District Court and upholding the statute as constitu-
tional, the Tenth Circuit considered:
[W]hether the DPPA is a valid exercise of congressional power to
which contrary state law must yield consistent with constitutional
principals [sic] of federalism and the Tenth Amendment' s reservation
to the States of all 'powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States.'
55
The Tenth Circuit based its reasoning on two United States Supreme
Court cases that set aside acts of Congress on Tenth Amendment
56grounds. First, in New York v. United States, the Court considered a
provision that forced state legislatures either to enact laws to regulate the
disposal of the state's nuclear waste, or to take title and possession of the
waste and associated liabilities.57 Failing to "choose" between the two
options resulted "in the state becoming liable for all damages waste gen-
49. See Oklahoma v. United States, 994 F. Supp. 1358, 1359 (Okla. 1997), rev'd, 161 F.3d
1266 (10th Cir. 1998).
50. See Oklahoma, 994 F. Supp. at 1360.
51. See id. -
52. See id. at 1364.
53. Id. at 1363 (quoting U.S. CONST. AMEND X).
54. Id. at 1362.
55. Oklahoma v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266, 1268 (10th Cir. 1998).
56. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
57. See New York, 505 U.S. at 151-54.
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erators suffered as a result of the state's inaction."" In New York, the
Court held that the provision violated the division of authority between
state and federal governments, because the law "effectively required
states either to legislate pursuant to Congress' direction, or to implement
an administrative solution." '9 The Court emphasized that a state could
not decline to administer the program, and was forced to follow Con-
gress' mandate with either choice. 6° The Court held that Congress
couldn't commandeer "'the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.'
6
1
62In the second case, Printz v. United States, the Court declared the
interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act un-
constitutional because the provisions required state and local law en-
forcement officials to conduct background checks on gun purchasers.63
The Court held that Congress couldn't circumvent the prohibitions set
out in New York by stating "[t]he Federal Government may not compel
the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program."
64
In Oklahoma, the State argued that the DPPA violates the mandates
set out in New York and Printz because the DPPA directs the state to
specifically regulate the disclosure of motor vehicle information accord-
ing to a federally mandated program. The United States, in contrast,
argued that the Constitution only prohibits Congress from requiring
states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program designed to
address problems created by third parties, and does not prohibit Congress
66from regulating state activity directly.
67The United States cited South Carolina v. Baker, where the Court
reasoned that requiring states to enact legislation is "'an inevitable con-
sequence of regulating a state activity. Any federal regulation demands
compliance. That a State wishing to engage in certain activity must take
administrative and sometimes legislative action to comply with federal
standards regulating that activity is a commonplace that presents no con-
stitutional defect."'
68
The Tenth Circuit determined that Oklahoma's arguments against
the DPPA were not as persuasive as those advanced in Printz or New
58. Oklahoma, 161 F.3d at 1269 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 174-77).
59. Id. at 1269.
60. See New York, 505 U.S. at 176-77.
61. Id. at 176 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264,
288 (1981)).
62. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
63. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 933-34.
64. Id. at 933 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 188).
65. See Oklahoma v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266, 1268 (10th Cir. 1998).
66. See Oklahoma, 161 F.3d at 1270.
67. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
68. Oklahoma, 161 F.3d at 1270 (quoting South Carolina, 485 U.S. at 514-15).
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York. "Unlike the federal statute in New York, the DPPA does not com-
mandeer the state legislative process by requiring states to enact legisla-
tion regulating the disclosure of personal information from motor vehicle
records. Rather, the DPPA directly regulates the disclosure of such in-
formation and preempts contrary state law., 69 Also, the Court reasoned
that, unlike the statute in New York, the DPPA allows Oklahoma an al-
ternative. "If states do not wish to comply with those regulations, they
may stop disseminating information in their motor vehicle records to the
public." 70
The court also distinguished the DPPA from the statute in Printz,
stating that "the DPPA does not conscript state officials to enforce fed-
eral law. ' 71 "The DPPA neither limits a state's ability to regulate in the
field of automobile licensing and registration, an exercise traditionally
left to the states, nor restricts a state's ability to use motor vehicle infor-
mation in its own regulatory activities.
7 2
The Tenth Circuit also cited Baker, which "rejected the notion that
the federal government may never force a state wishing to engage in
certain activity to take administrative or legislative actions to comply
with federal standards."73 The Court acknowledged the Supreme Court's
trend toward striking down federal laws that "commandeer" state legis-
lative and administrative processes, but found the logic in Baker to be
controlling. "[A]ny expansion of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence to
invalidate the DPPA is best left to the Supreme Court. At this stage...
we find nothing that requires us to invalidate the DPPA. 74
C. Supreme Court Decision: Reno v. Condon
75
In Reno v. Condon, the Supreme Court upheld the DPPA as a consti-
tutional assertion of Congress' power to regulate the dissemination of
personal information obtained through motor vehicle records,76 thus reaf-
firming the Tenth Circuit's decision in Oklahoma v. United States."
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous court, first determined
that the DPPA is a valid exercise of Congress' authority to regulate inter-
state commerce under the Commerce Clause, because motor vehicle rec-
ords are "'a thin[g] in interstate commerce.' 78 "[I]nsurers, manufactur-
ers, direct marketers and others engaged in interstate commerce [use this
69. Id. at 1272 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 178).
70. Id. at 1272.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. (citing South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988)).
74. Id. at 1272.
75. 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000).
76. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672.
77. 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998).
78. Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 671.
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information] to contact drivers with customized solicitations... [making
the information's] sale or release into the interstate stream of business
sufficient to support congressional regulation."'79
The Court then considered the Tenth Amendment issues raised by
Printz and New York. The Court found those cases do not apply to the
DPPA, because the federal statute in question neither required state leg-
islatures to enact a particular kind of law nor commanded state officers to
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.8 0 The controlling
case, according to the Court, is South Carolina v. Baker, which forced
many States to amend state statutes to comply with the federal statute.8 '
However, the Court held that action to be "an inevitable consequence of
regulating a state activity .... That a State wishing to engage in certain
activity must take administrative and sometimes legislative action to
comply with federal standards ...is a commonplace that presents no
constitutional defect. 82
In Reno, the Court applied similar reasoning to the DPPA, finding
that the statute does not require a State to regulate its own citizens. 3 "The
DPPA regulates the states as the owners of databases. It does not require
the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it
does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal
statutes regulating private individuals.,
84
D. Other Circuits
The DPPA sparked challenges in the Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits, which split on the issue. Both the Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits held the statute unconstitutional, while the Tenth and Seventh
Circuits upheld the statute as a valid exercise of Congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause.
1. Holding the Statute Unconstitutional: The Fourth Circuit
In Condon v. Reno, the District Court held that the DPPA violated
the Tenth Amendment and permanently enjoined the United States from
enforcing the statute against South Carolina.85 The Fourth Circuit af-
firmed, rejecting arguments from the United States that the DPPA statute
16
is valid under the Commerce Clause. The Court considered Printz and
79. Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995)).
80. See id. at 672.
81. See id. (citing South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988)).
82. Id. (citing South Carolina, 485 U.S. at 514-15).
83. See id. at 672.
84. Id.
85. Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 979 (D.S.C. 1997), affd, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998),
rev'd, Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000).
86. Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 465 (4th Cir. 1998), rev'd, Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666
(2000).
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New York and acknowledged that the DPPA is different in several re-
spects from the statutes struck down in those cases.87 The DPPA does not
require states to enact legislation and does not require that state officials
report or arrest violators of the DPPA, but under the statute, state offi-
cials must administer the DPPA.8 8 "The Supreme Court, in both New
York and Printz, has made it perfectly clear that the Federal Government
may not require State officials to administer a federal regulatory pro-
,,89
gram.
The Fourth Circuit also rejected the United States' argument that the
Supreme Court holding in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority90 applied in this case.9' Under Garcia, Congress may only sub-
ject state governments to generally applicable laws.9' The United States
argued that the DPPA is constitutional under Garcia because it "'subjects
the States to the same type of regulation to which a private party could be
subjected."' 93 The Fourth Circuit soundly rejected this argument because
the DPPA in fact only applies to the states. "A law is not generally appli-
cable simply because it could be generally applicable. That Congress
could subject private parties to the same type of regulation is irrelevant to
the Tenth Amendment. Congress may invade the sovereignty of the
States only when it actually enacts a law of general applicability."' 94
Finally, the Fourth Circuit rejected the federal government's con-
tention that Congress enacted the DPPA to protect an individual's Four-
teenth Amendment right to privacy. The Court noted that personal in-
formation on drivers' licenses is accessible from a number of other
sources and is provided by individuals to strangers to cash checks and
purchase alcohol. 95 The Fourth Circuit also stated that pervasive regula-
tion, such as motor vehicle registration, leads to a limited expectation of
privacy. 96 "[N]either the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever found a
constitutional right to privacy with respect to the type of information
found in motor vehicle records. 97
87. Condon, 155 F.3d at 460.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
91. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 461.
92. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528.
93. Condon, 155 F.3d at 461.
94. Id. at 462.
95. See id. at 465.




2. Holding the Statute Unconstitutional: The Eleventh Circuit
Pryor v. Reno,98 decided by the Eleventh Circuit in April 1999, fol-
lowed the Fourth Circuit's rationale in Condon.99 In Pryor, Alabama
sought an injunction to prevent the United States from enforcing the
DPPA, arguing that the statute was an unconstitutional directive requir-
ing it to administer a federal program in violation of the Tenth Amend-
ment.1°°
The district court held the statute constitutional, but the Eleventh
Circuit reversed, holding that because the statute is not self-administering
and state officers must review requests for information, the DPPA forces
states to administer a Congressionally mandated federal regulatory pro-
gram.' O' "[W]hen Congress requires the States to administer a federal
program, democratic accountability is diminished and for this reason the
Tenth Amendment is offended."'0 2
The Eleventh Circuit also believed the DPPA failed under the
Commerce Clause because "Congress drew its authority to regulate this
activity from its nexus to interstate commerce, and then proceeded to
exempt from the reach of the Act virtually all its interstate
connections. '  Congress enacted the DPPA to protect the public from
criminals, but "[i]n trying to protect legitimate governmental and busi-
ness uses of [personal] information . . . Congress riddled the Act with
more holes than Swiss cheese. Through these holes escaped most of the
interstate commerce activity covered by the Act."' 4
3. Upholding the Statute: The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit, like the Tenth, upheld the constitutionality of
the DPPA, but for different reasons. The court in Travis v. Reno °5 rea-
soned that since "[nlothing in the [DPPA] interferes with [a] state's abil-
ity to license drivers and remove dangerous ones from the road,"' 6 the
[DPPA] "affects states as owners of [information] databases; it does not
affect them in their role as governments" regulating driver licensing and
automobile registration.'O° This distinction is crucial, the court found,
because Congress is permitted to regulate states as marketplace partici-
98. 171 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated, 120 S. Ct. 929(2000).
99. Condon, 155 F.3d at 453.
100. Pryor, 171 F.3dat 1282, 1284.
101. See id. at 1284, 1286.
102. Id. at 1288.
103. Id. at 1284.
104. Id.
105. 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998).
106. Travis, 163 F.3d at 1003.
107. Id. at 1004.
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pants in other arenas through statutes such as the Video Privacy Protec-
tion Act.0 8
There is just no blinking the fact that federal law pervasively regu-
lates states as marketplace participants; the anti-commandeering rule [of
Printz and New York] comes into play only when the federal government
calls on the states to use their sovereign powers as regulators of their
citizens. Because the [DPPA] affects states as owners of data, rather than
as sovereigns, it does not commandeer states in violation of the Consti-
tution. Wisconsin is no more a regulator or law enforcer when it decides
what information to release from its database than is the corner Block-
buster Video outlet.' °9
The United States argued that, because "[s]tatute books teem with
laws regulating the disclosure of information from databases," the DPPA
does not place states at a disadvantage when compared to similarly situ-
ated private entities and is therefore not unconstitutional. 10 "Discrimina-
tion against states is forbidden, but a nondiscriminatory system may take
more than one law to implement. A statute covering all databases would
rival the Internal Revenue Code for complexity without offering states
any real defense from the cost and inconvenience of regulation."'''1
Finally, the Seventh Circuit rejected news media claims that the
DPPA violates the First Amendment by limiting access to information in
public records, writing, "[p]eering into public records is not part of the
'freedom of speech' that the [F]irst [A]mendment protects.""' 2 Instead,
those protesting the limitation of public information should use the Free-
dom of Information Act to request the information and, if access is de-
nied, should sue the agency that should have disclosed the information.'3
D. Analysis
These constitutional challenges to the DPPA raised the critical ques-
tion of how much control Congress may assert over the states to limit the
disclosure of personal information obtained through state regulatory ac-
tivities. The controversy pitted a national attempt to protect the privacy
rights of individuals against a State's right to regulate its affairs without
interference from the federal government, and centered upon two distinct
lines of cases. The first, concerning the power of Congress to regulate the
108. See id. (citing Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994)).
109. Id. at 1004-05.
110. Id. at 1005.
111. Id. at1006.
112. Id. at 1007.
113. See id.
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"'states as states"', 14 is governed by Garcia" ' and Baker,'16 and allows
"Congress to enact laws of general applicability that incidentally apply to
state governments.""' 7 These cases allow Congress to directly regulate
state activity even if States must create legislation to comply, as long as
that regulation "does not commandeer the state legislative and adminis-
trative processes.""' 8 The second line of cases deals with congressional
authority to direct states to implement or administer a federal regulatory
scheme," 9 and is governed by New York' and Printz.2' Under these
cases, "Congress may not enact any law that would direct the functioning
of the States' executives or legislatures."' 22
Condon is distinguishable from Printz primarily because the Printz
statute specifically required state officials to monitor and regulate the
sale of handguns-to take affirmative actions in order to comply with the
federal statute."' The DPPA, in contrast, provides that states "shall not
knowingly disclose or otherwise make available" personal information
obtained from motor vehicle records.' 24 Under the DPPA, state officials
are asked not to act-which prevents the statute from "conscripting" state
officials in the same way in which Printz required conscription. 25 In
Condon, the state argued that the DPPA forced officials to implement a
federal statute, because state workers must not release records without
consent.' 26 But, as the Tenth Circuit pointed out, "[i]f states do not wish
to comply with those regulations, they may stop disseminating informa-
tion in their motor vehicle records to the public.', 27 The states have a
choice, even if choosing not to disseminate the information results in a
significant loss of revenue."' In New York, unlike Condon, Congress
failed to preserve a state's ability to choose its method of compliance." 9
The statute in New York forced state legislatures to choose between en-
114. Robert C. Lind & Natalie B. Eckhart, The Constitutionality of the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act, 17-SUM COMM. LAW 18, 20 (1999) (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
115. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554.
116. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988).
117. Lind & Eckhart, supra note 114, at 20.
118. Id. at 21.
119. See id.
120. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
121. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
122. Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 458 (4th Cir. 1998).
123. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 904.
124. 18 U.S.C. § 272 1(a) (1994).
125. Condon, 155 F.3d at 460.
126. See id.
127. Oklahoma v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266, 1272 (10th Cit. 1998).
128. See generally Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that the
Wisconsin Department of Transportation received about eight million dollars each year from the sale
of motor vehicle information).
129. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
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acting laws to regulate the disposal of the state's nuclear waste, or taking
title and possession of the waste and its liabilities. 13 Thus, providing a
choice between two equally unacceptable options in New York provided
no choice at all, but the DPPA simply states the federal requirement and
leaves states with the power to decide how they will comply with that
requirement.
The Supreme Court's decision upholding the DPPA and affirming
the Tenth Circuit's reasoning shifted recent Tenth Amendment jurispru-
dence away from the broad-based restrictions on federal limitations of
state power laid out in Printz and New York. The decision paves the way
for future congressional legislation regulating state activities, including
privacy legislation, so long as that regulation falls short of actually dic-
tating state legislation or forcing state officials to implement federal pro-
grams. If a state retains a choice in how it will comply with a federal
statute, the Court seems willing to accept that statute as a valid regulation
of state activities.
PART II. Is CONFIDENTIAL TAX RETURN INFORMATION REALLY
CONFIDENTIAL?: STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS OF FEDERAL PRIVACY
LEGISLATION
A. Background
When the legislature first introduced income tax in 1861, it required
that all tax return information be available for public inspection and re-
view. 3' The legislature abolished the tax in 1872, but then reinstated the
income tax in 1894, this time requiring tax information not be disclosed
to the public. 32 After a Constitutional amendment ensured the ability to
impose and collect taxes on personal income, Congress enacted the
Revenue Act of 1913, which required that tax returns be public records
open to any examination authorized by the President. 3 After 1913,
Presidents generally shared tax return information with governmental
entities as needed, and did not disclose the information to the public.'
34
In the 1970's, Congress grew concerned about governmental abuse
of the tax return information sharing system, because the Nixon Admini-
stration was using tax information obtained from the IRS to "harass and
intimidate political opponents.' ' 35 This concern caused Congress to enact
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 36 which states that tax "[r]eturns and return
130. See id. at 169.
13 1. See Joseph J. Darby, Confidentiality and the Law of Taxation, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 577,
578 (1998).
132. See id.
133. See id. at 578-79.




information shall be confidential... 3 The Tax Reform Act has always
included a number of statutory exceptions to the general rule that tax
return information is confidential.'3 8 The Tax Reform Act provides for
both civil and criminal penalties against government officials who dis-
close confidential tax information outside of those exceptions.
39
In recent years, however, several Circuit Courts have developed a
judicially created exception to this statute and allow the disclosure of
information in press releases that publicize tax convictions. 4 0 The Tenth
Circuit rejected the concept in one 1983 case" ' and embraced it in a 1999decision. 42
B. Tenth Circuit Case: Rice v. United States 43
1. Facts
A jury convicted Rice of filing false tax refund claims and tax re-
turns in March 1994, and according to standard departmental procedure,
the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") issued two press releases publiciz-
ing the criminal proceedings.'" Rice, a certified public accountant, filed a
civil action against the United States claiming that the IRS wrongfully
disclosed confidential tax information in the press releases. "' The Dis-
trict Court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of the
United States and the IRS, concluding that the press releases did not dis-
close confidential tax information about Rice, and "that all the informa-
tion contained in the press releases came from public documents and
proceedings. Specifically, the court found that ... an IRS [agent who
had prepared the press releases] had reviewed the indictment against
137. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (1994 & Supp. HI1997).
138. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(c)-(p) ((1994 & Supp. III 1997) (authorizing the release of tax return
information to state tax officials, people with a material interest, Congressional committees, the
President, White House personnel, heads of federal agencies, the Treasury Department and
Department of Justice and federal agencies for purposes of non tax-law administration).
139. See 26 U.S.C. § 7431(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (creating a private cause of action for
damages against the United States for improper disclosure of tax information); 26 U.S.C. § 7213(a)
(1994 & Supp. III 1997) (imposing criminal punishment for willful disclosures of tax information by
government employees).
140. See generally Rowley v. United States, 76 F.3d 796, 802 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that
information recorded in a federal tax lien may be disclosed to the public); Lampert v. United States,
854 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that once tax information is made public in court
proceedings, the taxpayer loses the right to privacy of that information); Thomas v. United States,
890 F.2d 18, 21-22 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that disclosure of tax return information published in a
tax court opinion does not violate confidentiality requirements).
141. See Rice v. United States, 166 F.3d 1088, 1092 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that information
gleaned from public records and public proceedings may be disclosed without violating
confidentiality requirements).
142. See Rodgers v. Hyatt, 697 F.2d 899, 906 (10th Cir. 1983) (rejecting the argument that
prior in-court statements stripped that information of its confidentiality).
143. 166F.3d 1088 (10th Cir. 1999).
144. See id. at 1089.
145. See id.
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Rice, attended his trial and sentencing," and used that information as her
only source for the press releases.'4 6 Rice appealed the decision, arguing
that because the information contained in the press releases was confi-
dential tax return information, the United States violated the confidenti-
ality provisions of the Tax Reform Act.' 7 Rice also argued alternatively
that there were genuine issues of material fact about the source of the
information contained in the press releases and that summary judgment
was inappropriate.'
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit rejected Rice's claims, refusing to hold that the
IRS press release necessarily constituted an unauthorized disclosure of
tax return information.4 9 The Court distinguished the case from its 1983
decision in Rodgers v. Hyatt,'5° which held that an in-court statement
based on confidential information did not justify an IRS agent's later
discussion of that information with third parties.'5 ' In Rodgers, the Court
found that the IRS agent had obtained information from internal docu-
ments and tax returns, testified about that information in court, and then
later disclosed that information to a third party out of court.'52 On the
other hand, in Rice, the agent obtained her information from public pro-
ceedings and documents; the Court held that "whether information about
a taxpayer may be classified as 'return information' invoking application
of § 6103 turns on the immediate source of the information."'53 The
Tenth Circuit also stated that Rice had not presented sufficient evidence
that the IRS agent obtained the press release information from an imper-
missible source, which would require vacating the district court's grant
of summary judgment.'5
Like it or not, a trial is a public event. The IRS press releases in this
case did not publicize Rice's tax return information; they publicized
public proceedings and documents. While those proceedings and
documents may have revealed 'return information,' that revelation
was proper under the exception to § 6103 allowing such disclosure in
federal court where the taxpayer is a party to the proceedings.'55
146. Id. at 1090.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See Rice v. United States, 166 F.3d 1088, 1091 (10th Cir. 1999).
150. 697 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1983).
151. See Rice, 166 F.3d at 1091 (citing Rodgers v. Hyatt, 697 F.2d 899, 905-06 (10th Cir.
1983)).
152. See Rodgers, 697 F.2d at 904-05.
153. Rice, 166 F.3d at 1091-92.





The Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have held that confidential tax
return information that is brought into the public domain through public
proceedings can be publicized without violating the Tax Reform Act's
confidentiality requirements.'56 The Fifth Circuit, in contrast, has favored
a strict statutory construction of the Tax Reform Act and held that the
source of the disclosed information determines whether the statute has
been violated.'57
1. Ninth Circuit
In Lampert v. United States,1s the Ninth Circuit held that not al-
lowing the publication of tax return information obtained from public
records would violate the purpose of the Tax Reform Act. 5 9 "We believe
that Congress sought to prohibit only the disclosure of confidential tax
return information. Once tax return information is made part of the pub-
lic domain, the taxpayer may no longer claim a right of privacy in that
information. '" '6 Lampert involved a number of cases consolidated on
appeal in which the government issued press releases publicizing actions




One year after Lampert, the Seventh Circuit decided a similar case
in which the IRS sent a press release detailing losses and damages to the
taxpayer's hometown newspaper. 62 In Thomas v. United States,163 the
court did not consider whether disclosing return information in a judicial
record bars taxpayers from complaining about subsequent disclosures,
because the court found the press release information did not come from
Thomas' tax return, but from the Tax Court's opinion in the case. '64 The
Seventh Circuit "refused to decide whether the tax-court opinion re-
moved the 'protective cloak' from the information, so that the IRS would
156. See Rowley v. United States, 76 F.3d 796, 802 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that information
recorded in a federal tax lien may be disclosed to the public); Thomas v. United States, 890 F.2d 18,
21-22 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that disclosure of tax return information published in a tax court
opinion does not violate confidentiality requirements); Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 335, 338
(9th Cit. 1988) (holding that once tax information is made public in court proceedings, the taxpayer
loses the right to privacy of that information).
157. See Darrell Calvin, How Far Do the Powers of the LR.S. Extend in the Fifth Circuit?:
Johnson v. Sawyer, 5 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 79, 91-92 (1998).
158. 854 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1988).
159. See Lampert, 854 F.2d at 338.
160. Id.
161. Seeid. at 336.
162. See Thomas v. United States, 890 F.2d 18, 19 (7th Cir. 1989).
163. Thomas, 890 F.2d at 18.
164. See Calvin, supra note 157, at 84.
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not have been in violation of the statute if it had disseminated the infor-
mation directly from its files.' ' 5
3. Sixth Circuit
In 1996, the Sixth Circuit in Rowley v. United States'6 6 considered
taxpayer claims that the government violated the Tax Reform Act by
disclosing tax return information when advertising a public auction of the
taxpayer's property to pay a tax obligation.16' The Government argued
that it did not violate the statute because the tax information in question
was public record due to recording the tax liens.668 The court ruled for the
Government, stating that the recording of federal tax liens "is designed to
provide public notice and is thus qualitatively different from disclosures
made in judicial proceedings, which are only incidentally made
public.' 69
D. Analysis
The statutory requirements of the Tax Reform Act represent "a ten-
sion between two conflicting public policies: (1) a Congressional policy
favoring the confidentiality of [tax] returns and (2) the need of various
governmental institutions to gain access to taxpayer-supplied information
in order to perform their official duties."'170 The Tenth Circuit is correct in
its reasoning that publishing tax information about a convicted tax
evader, when that information is part of a public recording or court tes-
timony, does not breach an existing right of privacy. People accused or
convicted of crimes generally lose any right to privacy relating to their
names, addresses, details of their crimes-even background information
and previous convictions-once criminal charges are brought into open
court. This information becomes part of the public record, and the media
and the public-at-large have access to the information.
Financial information submitted on tax forms during the crime of tax
fraud or tax evasion is no different. By putting false or misleading infor-
mation on his tax forms, Rice opened himself up to investigation by the
IRS and forfeited any right to privacy for that information. Just as an
indictment for assault or murder might necessitate the release of details
of an abusive relationship, false financial information might be essential
to prove a case of tax fraud. Therefore the IRS, like the general media,
can publish details about criminal convictions that have been the subject
of open public court proceedings.
165. Id.
166. 76 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 1996).
167. See Rowley, 76 F.3d at 797.
168. See id.
169. Id. at 801.
170. Darby, supra note 131, at 578.
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At the same time, the Tenth Circuit makes .an irrelevant distinction
between the IRS agent in Rodgers (who testified in open court and then
provided that information to a third party) t7 ' and the agent in Rice (who
did not testify, but provided information from another agent's testimony
to third parties through a press release).' 72 A person convicted of tax
evasion gives up the right to keep financial records used in a criminal act
from the public once the court proceeding exposes that information.
Consequently, it should not matter whether the investigating agent or a
public relations agent discusses that information because the defendant
no longer has a right to keep that information private.
Critics of the judicially created exception allowing disclosure of tax
information after public proceedings argue that the IRS and the tax dis-
closure requirements are statute-driven, and that a statute must create any
exceptions to those requirements as well.' 73 "If any further life is given
the [IRS], it is for Congress, and not the judiciary to declare. If taxpayers
... are to have their transgressions publicized, it should be with the spe-
cific approval of their elected representatives.""'7 Critics also discredit the
suggestion that material disclosed in public proceedings loses its confi-
dential nature:
Confidentiality is a matter of degree, and simply because material
may be available for public inspection, it should not be implied that the
public already has or ever will obtain knowledge of such information...
• Whether public information is found in a court opinion or a public rec-
ord, the public awareness of such information is generally very limited.' 5
Ensuring the confidentiality of tax return information will help pro-
mote respect for our tax system, encourage truthful disclosures on re-
turns, and limit the abuse of government power, according to supporters
of strict statutory interpretation. Distrustful taxpayers "may be less in-
clined to be faithful to [IRS] mandates when tax day rolls around each
year," but government can foster respect by ensuring "that government
agents are not allowed to abuse power simply because it is there for the
taking."'76 The Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits, and most recently the
Tenth Circuit, appear to be much less concerned with fostering respect or
ensuring confidentiality once information has been released into the
public domain.
CONCLUSION
As technology improves and access to information continues to in-
crease, the courts will likely consider many more informational-privacy
171. See Rogers v. Hyatt, 697 F.2d 899, 906 (10th Cir. 1983).
172. See Rice v. United States, 166 F.3d 1088, 1092 (10th Cir. 1992).
173. See Calvin, supra note 157, at 80.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 96.
176. Id. at 96-97.
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cases. During this survey period alone, the Tenth Circuit decided two
important informational-privacy cases, and the holdings in each of those
cases conflicted with at least one other Circuit. 77 Regarding the issue of
personal information derived from driver's license and motor vehicle
registration records, the Tenth Circuit found, and the U.S. Supreme Court
confirmed, that Congress has power to regulate the disclosure of such
information by the states. 17 The Court's decision to uphold the DPPA
may open the door to future congressional legislation to protect the pri-
vacy rights of individuals, as long as the legislation affects interstate
commerce and does not conscript or commandeer the states. The Tenth
Circuit conflicted with at least one other Circuit in its most recent deci-
sion on permitting disclosure of tax-return information filed with the
IRS. 7 9 This decision favored the Government's need to publicize con-
victions for tax fraud over the protection of confidential information al-
ready in the public record.80 Rice illustrates the problems courts have
when interpreting privacy statutes that do not implicate the
Constitution."'
These differences of opinion among the Circuits indicate the diffi-
culty courts face when trying to balance the privacy rights of an individ-
ual with the Government and business need to collect and distribute per-
sonal information. Balancing will become even more difficult in the fu-
ture as access and availability of information continue to increase. The
need for uniform privacy theory and privacy law to help with that bal-
ancing will become increasingly important as well. "Rather than seeing
privacy as a static, unchanging feature of human existence, theoretical
approaches should regard privacy as a dynamic, adaptive process that
derives full meaning only from its broader cultural context.' ', 2 The need
for a fresh approach to privacy rights is particularly great in the area of
electronic communications and computers. "Only by deciding a priori
what it is that matters about privacy, and by establishing a comprehen-
sive set of policy guidelines will we be able to adapt our privacy laws to
a rapidly changing socioeconomic context.' ' 3
Creating uniform and consistent privacy laws is especially neces-
sary to combat the potential abuse of power that personal information
provides to Government and businesses. "Knowledge is power, and in
any social interaction, an imbalance in the amount and nature of personal
information possessed by each party creates and perpetuates power dis-
177. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998); Rice v. United
States, 166 F.3d 1088 (10th Cir. 1999).
178. See Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000).
179. See, e.g., Rice, 166 F.3d at 1092.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. Byford, supra note 1, at 7.
183. Id. at 3.
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parities," according to one proponent of overhauling privacy law. 14 "In a
society where surveillance and the collection of personal information
have become institutionalized, those who control the data collection pro-
cess have potentially immense social power at their disposal."'85
Stephanie Reedy
184. Id. at 24.
185. Id.
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